Volatile Perceptions: The Power of the Public Sphere to Reshape Science by Smith, Robert Scott (Author) et al.
Volatile Perceptions:  
The Power of the Public Sphere to Reshape Science  
by 
Robert Scott Smith 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Mark Lussier, Chair 
Ronald Broglio 
Daniel Bivona 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2012  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis examines the role of the media and popular culture in defining 
the shape and scope of what we think of today as "science." As a source of 
cognitive authority the scientific establishment is virtually beyond dispute. The 
intellectual clout of science seemingly elevates it to a position outside the 
influence of the general population. Yet in reality the emergence and evolution of 
the public sphere, including popular culture, has had a profound impact on the 
definition and application of science. What science is and how it relates to the life 
of the ordinary person are hardly static concepts; the public perception of science 
has been molding its boundaries since at least the 18th century. During the 
Enlightenment "natural philosophy" was broadly accessible and integrated nicely 
with other forms of knowledge. As the years passed into the 19th century, 
however, science became increasingly professionalized and distinct, until the 
"Two Cultures" had fully developed.  The established scientific institution 
distanced itself from the nonscientific community, leaving the task of 
communicating scientific knowledge to various popularizers, who typically 
operated through the media and often used the mantle of science to further their 
own social or political agendas. Such isolation from orthodox science forced the 
public to create an alternate form of science for popular consumption, a form 
consisting mainly of decontextualized facts, often used in contrast to other forms 
of thought (i.e. religion, art, or pseudoscience).  However, with the recent advent 
of "Web 2.0" and the increasing prominence of convergence culture, the role of 
the public sphere is undergoing a dramatic revolution. Concepts such as 
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"collective intelligence" are changing consumers of information into simultaneous 
producers, establishing vast peer networks of collaboration and enabling the 
public to bypass traditional sources of authority. This new hypermobility of 
information and empowerment of the public sphere are just now beginning to 
break down science's monolithic status. In many ways, it seems, we are entering a 
new Enlightenment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
While vacationing in Victoria, British Columbia one summer, my family 
and I decided to spend an evening with a “ghost tour” of the city, a walking tour 
in which the guide relates some of the “haunted” past of various historical 
locations.  Before starting, the guide introduced the tour with a brief summary of 
Victoria’s ghost-hunting scene and told us why this city in particular was such a 
hotspot.  I expected to hear a predictable account of the troubled and violent 
history of the island, but instead the guide told us that Victoria is haunted due to 
the effect of the surrounding seawater and basaltic bedrock, both of which were 
“proven” to insulate a location’s paranormal energy.  I was taken back by this 
unusual explanation and the guide’s repeated assertion that “these are not just 
stories, these are real.”  What I thought was going to be a light-hearted evening of 
campfire-style ghost stories mixed with an architectural tour turned out to be a 
rather serious, professional sounding supernatural investigation.   
Of course, nobody asked our guide to provide a reference for the supposed 
research linking ghost sightings and basaltic rock; it was simply a rhetorical 
maneuver; by using a very rational, scientific sounding explanation to validate 
something so thoroughly irrational and non-scientific.  Our guide was able to 
provide her story with the illusion of “reality” that she later reiterated.  When 
something sounds scientific, it appears that the debate is settled. 
“Science” is a difficult notion to pinpoint.  Modern culture often uses the 
term interchangeably to refer to either a singular, specific establishment, or a 
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whole set of loosely connected ideas. Science is at once seen as a tool for 
oppression and as a great equalizer of men, both as an unstoppable force of 
industrial assimilation and the only hope of the natural environment.  The unique, 
even mystical, vernacular that science possesses can be utilized to convince 
shoppers to buy a particular brand of shampoo, or to lend even the most unusual 
of notions an aura of credibility.  If a single thread exists which ties these 
concepts of science together, for most of American culture anyway, it seems to be 
in its distinct separation from that culture.  Whatever science may be, it 
apparently is removed from everyday life.  Such rhetorical distance situates 
science in a paradoxical position within modern society.  On one hand it retains 
immense influence as a source of cognitive authority.  “Simply labeling a piece of 
information as scientific,” writes Daniel Patrick Thurs, “has often commanded 
attention and respect, if not assent” (1).  The tendency of the American public to 
accept scientific pronouncements with childlike faith, however, is balanced by an 
increasing disinterest in, disconnection from, and perhaps even suspicion of 
science on the part of many Americans.  For example, Thurs cites a study by the 
National Science Foundation that concluded that of all the most closely followed 
news stories in the past few decades, only around 2 percent were related to 
scientific breakthroughs or exploration (2).  Despite the ubiquitous position 
science occupies in the lives of so many Americans, in any of its several forms, it 
seems hardly a secret that the average person’s grasp of scientific principles and 
procedures is quite often very feeble.  C.P. Snow addressed this schism between 
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science and the public in his “Two Cultures” lecture of 1959, and since that time 
the division has changed little.      
 How such a state of detachment came to be is a more complex issue.  The 
division does seem to be a fairly modern invention.  So where did things between 
science and the public go wrong?  From the point of view of some within the 
scientific community, most of whom (but not all) we would label as “scientists,” 
the fault ultimately lies with the so-called “popularizers” of science, those who 
seek to translate and pass on scientific findings to the general public.  As John C. 
Burnham writes, “changes in the way in which science and health came to be 
popularized…ultimately reduced and frustrated the cultural impact of both 
science and scientists” (4).  According to this view, once the job of keeping the 
public informed was largely given up by the “well-educated missionaries of 
science” it was picked up by journalists, advertisers, and others who sought 
primarily to exploit and sensationalize the once pure knowledge celebrated during 
the Enlightenment in order to suit less dignified purposes (Burnham 4).  From the 
perspective of this scientifically orthodox mindset, the definition of “science” 
should be the exclusive property of those in the field, and should certainly exclude 
heretical notions such as pseudoscience or the ever-repulsive superstition. 
  Yet despite the desire of the scientific community to retain complete 
control of what is and is not considered science, we must not forget that science is 
“first and foremost a word.  The ways in which we relate to science have a great 
deal to do with how we have learned to talk about it,” and to the vast majority of 
people alive today, talking about it is all they can do (Thurs 2).  “History of 
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science,” writes Katherine Pandora and Karen A. Rader, “is more than the history 
of scientists: it is also the history of what ‘science’ and ‘nature’ mean to each one 
of us” (350).  To many Americans, the boundaries of science may be quite 
flexible.  Nonetheless, boundaries exist, and serve to isolate science from the 
ordinary rhetoric of the modern world.  Such distinctness can contribute to the 
sense of authority science seems to possess, but it can also be turned around.  
Thurs notes that “a science more easily set apart has also been a science more 
easily set aside; greater distinctness has created novel possibilities for subversion 
and containment as well as celebration” (3).  By labeling science as one of many 
different types of knowledge, to some it may become something akin to a single 
product in the marketplace of ideas and opinions.  Circumscribing scientific 
thought and process also leads to a tendency to emphasize science’s position in 
relation to other modes of thought and leads to such comparisons as “science and 
politics,” “science and the humanities” or the ever-present “science and religion.”   
 This latter coupling is particularly troubling to society and has been the 
fodder for an endless amount of acrimonious debate.  This conflict, often called 
the warfare, of science and religion has gone on in earnest since at least the last 
half of the nineteenth century, and has changed remarkably little since that time.  
That the contest between these two “sovereigns” of the intellectual domain 
remains so potent today is a testament not to any major difference between them, 
but rather that science and religion are so similar.  Theologian Richard Coleman 
even declares them “sibling rivals,” primarily because they contend for the same 
intellectual property (4).  The rivalry today shapes nearly every facet of “science 
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talk” and continuously bleeds over into other rhetorical arenas, such as politics 
and education.  Sometimes it seems difficult to speak of either science or religion 
independently. 
 But rather than simply picking a side and going to war myself, I believe it 
will be of more value now to reexamine the points of attachment between science 
(or religion for that matter) and American culture.  I argue that, in its never-
ending struggle for the loyalty of the people, the scientific community mistakenly 
assumes that the public is passive.  The conception of science as a separated realm 
of ideas from which society can reap the blessings of advancement is becoming 
altogether unattractive to a public increasingly defined by convergence.  In other 
words, if we are seeing an increasing shift away from science or religion on the 
part of the general public, then it may not necessarily be the result of any sort of 
victory of one side or the other.  If science and religion are the two traditional 
intellectual sovereigns, in recent years they are finding themselves in the path of a 
democratizing, revolutionary third force: the participatory culture of the social 
media. 
 This idea is not altogether new.  In his book How Superstition Won and 
Science Lost, Burnham declares that in the modern day science’s old nemesis, 
superstition, took the form of the modern media and ultimately conquered the 
orthodox notion of science (7).  That was in 1987.  Obviously, media has changed 
a great deal since that time; the flow of information now is vastly greater, due 
mainly to the rise of the Internet, and is much less unidirectional.  This new 
hyper-mobility of information could be a great asset to science if it seeks to 
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engage the public in a more productive conversation.  This will require scientists 
to stop viewing the “intellectual commons” of popular culture as an insignificant 
distraction but rather as a valuable avenue to collaborate and engage with the 
culture whose indifference they now lament.      
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EMERGENCE AND ALIENATION OF MODERN SCIENCE 
In many ways, the formation of what would eventually be modern, 
institutionalized science, as well as several of the public’s perceptions of that 
science, began during the Enlightenment.  The period’s general emphasis on 
discovery, objectivity, and (relatively) secular thought elevated natural philosophy 
(the predecessor of what would become today’s science) into a more public arena, 
to be used as a tool of social and intellectual reform.  In the minds of these natural 
philosophers, as Thomas Hankins observes, “The most virtuous pursuit of all 
would be the creation of a science of man that, through reason, would destroy 
prejudice and superstition and build a new society on objective scientific 
principles” (8).  The optimistic outlook on science’s potential led to “a movement 
that grew out of Enlightenment rationalism, but largely transformed it, by 
bringing a new imaginative intensity and excitement to scientific work.  It was 
driven by a common ideal of intense, even reckless, personal commitment to 
discovery,” a movement Richard Holmes refers to as “Romantic Science” (xvi).   
The equalizing, democratizing ideal of science common during the 
Enlightenment was reflected by the new accessibility of science education to 
those outside of the established authoritative circles.  The Lunar Society of 
Birmingham, for example, was “an illustration of the claim that London’s Royal 
Society was not the whole story of knowledge production outside of the 
universities in this period” (Chandler 89).  This period “became the first great age 
of the public scientific lecture, the laboratory demonstration and the introductory 
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textbook…It was the age when science began to be taught to children, and the 
‘experimental method’ became the basis of a new, secular philosophy of life” 
(Holmes xix).  Stark divisions between disciplines had yet to fully form, and 
therefore scholars could move freely across academic boundaries, creating a 
harmonious picture in which all knowledge came together for the benefit of 
mankind.  James Chandler argues that, “Before 1750, ‘science’ referred broadly to 
any systematically achieved knowledge…even the distinction between the 
sciences and the arts is a rather late development” (87).  He goes on to say that the 
intellectual movers and shakers comprising the Lunar Society, men like Erasmus 
Darwin, “epitomized a knowledge culture in Britain in which the differentiation 
between what we now call literature and science remained productively messy” 
(Chandler 88).  Men of science were free to comment on virtually any topic, and 
were very highly regarded by society.  As Hankins observes, “Although science 
itself might be entirely objective and without ethical content, its very objectivity 
made the natural philosopher a man of virtue.  Objectivity was the opposite of 
self-interest and ambition; the natural philosopher served mankind rather than 
himself” (7).  The emphasis on the progression of civilization resulted in a push to 
develop new ways to improve the quality of life, and advance society.  If we 
return to the Lunar Society for example, we find that “They were committed to 
practical matters – to making and doing things – and their impact on Britain and 
indeed the world is difficult to overestimate” (Chandler 89).   
Enlightenment ideals had a strong presence in America as well.  During 
the eighteenth century and up until about the mid 1800’s, “scientific rhetoric 
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constructed images of science that were thus accessible on many levels, paving 
the way for Americans to wander unhindered through…[a] grand scheme of 
knowledge into which separate statements about the world were expected to fit 
together smoothly” (Thurs 49).  Much of the “science” performed was by amateur 
practitioners, like Benjamin Franklin, often in public demonstrations or traveling 
shows, and usually emphasized the congruence of all types of knowledge, relying 
on its accessibility to provide authority.  Even this very open view of science can 
be connected with trends in popular culture.  Thurs notes how the rise of 
Jacksonian politics in America in the early 1800’s coincided with “a general 
blossoming of new –ologies, -isms, and –pathies intended for use by 
nonspecialists and on whose behalf adherents claimed the mantle of science” (30).  
This same democratizing force affected religious institutions as well, resulting in 
a wave of formation of new religious groups that questioned the authority of 
orthodox institutions.   
As for the relationship between science and religion at the time, it was 
largely congenial, at least at first.  While early movements in popular science, 
such as phrenology, were sometimes accused of subverting religious authority, 
more often they were used “to show how scientific and religious truths were 
harmonious, how they always supported one another, and how they cooperated 
seamlessly in revealing a consistent picture of creation” (Thurs 43).  Such 
blending of spiritualism and materialism prevented any large-scale conflict from 
erupting between science and theology, while also obscuring any potential 
boundary science may have had.  Natural philosophers usually adopted, at least in 
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public, “either austere intellectual Deism…or else the rather more picturesque 
Natural Theology” in order to keep scientific and religious ideas from clashing 
(Holmes 450).  Many during the period held to the belief that “The discovery of 
the laws of nature would necessarily lead to the discovery of God’s intentions, 
which formed the foundation of moral law” (Hankin 6). 
Indeed, the Enlightenment period of “Romantic Science” appears to 
represent a time when interest in science was high, its practitioners well regarded, 
and its outlook seemed markedly optimistic.  No wonder so many scientists today 
seem to view this period as the high point of science and culture (Gross and Levitt 
20).  However this period also saw the beginning of the cultural conflicts that 
would soon divide science from the rest of society, a point made by Mary Terrall: 
As these experimental sciences were cultivating the public and 
developing a broadly philosophical and accessible language, the 
laboratory and theoretical practices of science were becoming 
more, not less, specialized…As science appealed to a growing 
public, its practitioners worked harder to define themselves as a 
meritocratic elite. (273-4) 
This increasing specialization coincided with the emergence of a common 
conception that crystallized during the Enlightenment, and remains largely intact 
today: the “dazzling idea of the solitary scientific ‘genius’, thirsting and reckless 
for knowledge, for its own sake and perhaps at any cost” (Holmes xvii).  This 
image fully matured with the creating of the term “scientist” in 1834, coined 
specifically to create a new comprehensive category for scientific workers as a 
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definite class (Thurs 33).  Within this simple word lurked, as Holmes puts it, “the 
whole question of whether the new generation of professional ‘scientists’ would 
promote safe religious belief or a dangerous secular materialism,” an alarming 
ideological state that many retrospectively viewed as responsible for the disaster 
of the French Revolution (450).  Relations between science and religion were 
already tense due to recent scientific publications, most notably Charles Lyell’s 
Principles of Geology, which problematized the congruence of scientific thought 
and literal biblical interpretation.  With a new breed of professional practitioners 
at its helm, science began to separate itself from other realms of thought around 
the turn of the century.     
The nineteenth century was also a period when scientific concepts became 
available to a wider audience.  While it is true that before this time, natural 
philosophy was given considerable attention by certain portions of society, 
namely the literate and educated elites, there was little impetus to spread that 
knowledge to the lower classes; most intellectuals “accepted the inevitability of a 
society divided into classes, with the rural peasantry at the bottom” (Burns 93).  
This began to radically change during the nineteenth century.  In The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas describes the restructuring of 
society that emerged during this period as the “public sphere,” which served to 
mediate between the interest of the individual and the increasingly remote 
structure of the state, which was increasingly subsuming science (27).  Alongside 
the industrial revolution that brought practical, applied science to the forefront of 
everyday life, a communications revolution shaped the way the world saw itself.  
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The ongoing professionalization of science increased the pace of scientific 
activity while decreased publishing costs provided greater availability of books, 
newspapers and pamphlets about their findings to a readership whose size had 
been hugely augmented by rising rates of literacy. (Pandora and Rader 355).  The 
importance of this media revolution in redefining the cultural image of science is 
likely impossible to exaggerate.   
 With the release of groundbreaking and radical new scientific theories, 
evolution being arguably the most significant, science became a wedge that split 
society in two. Darwin’s 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species ignited the 
conflict between science and religion in a way like nothing before (and perhaps 
nothing since).  While Lyell and other geologists had already strained the 
relationship between science and religion, Holmes argues that Darwin’s work was 
particularly disruptive because for the first time science could provide a 
convincing alternative to religious creationist dogma, thus making religion 
unnecessary.  In Holmes’ apt phrase, “Darwin had indeed written a new Book of 
Genesis” (451).    
Science suddenly emerged as a totally independent realm of thought, one 
that could provide its own rational worldview.  The result was an explosion of 
rhetoric across numerous forms of media that emphasized clearly distinguishable 
boundaries to science, spoke at length about a unique “scientific method,” and 
severed science from other ways of thinking.  Familiar phrases such as “science 
says” and comparisons such as “science and religion” became common by the 
1870’s, and presented science as an anthropomorphized, individual entity in the 
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realm of thought (Thurs 55).  Such easy comparisons also altered the way people 
looked back at science.  Thurs demonstrates how the story of Galileo, now seen as 
a mythical clash between science and religion, almost never implied any religious 
criticism until the 1850’s; rather it was seen simply as an instance of society 
resisting new ideas (48).  Meanwhile, Michael White argues that Victorian era 
biographers of Isaac Newton, a figure all but deified by the scientific community 
since the Enlightenment, habitually glossed over Newton’s interests in alchemy 
and the occult, hoping to preserve his image as a man who stayed well within the 
newly reinforced boundaries of orthodox science (121).   Such powerful 
“recodings” of science and its history reified its newly formed distinctness, and 
left the public to choose between two conflicting approaches to reality. They also 
demonstrate that science quite simply does not speak for itself.   
The widening distance between the public and science caused some to see 
the necessity of intermediary voices to bridge the gap, and thus popularization in 
its modern form was born.  These early popularizers were often men of science 
themselves, such as Huxley and Tyndall; professionals who sought to “cleanse 
scientific thought of those elements that previously had connected public and 
scientific culture, including anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, teleological and 
ethical views of nature” (Lightman 101).  But eventually, and much to the chagrin 
of these men, an army of non-professional popularizers stepped in to capitalize on 
the newly formed market for science writing.  One notable example is the 
Reverend J. G. Wood, whose best-seller Common Objects of the Country was 
released only a year before On the Origin of Species and outsold the latter by a 
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margin of nearly 7 to 1 (Pandora and Rader 357).  As scientists began to pursue 
more specialized research, they became increasingly out of touch with the general 
public, and ultimately the field of popularization was almost entirely left to non-
scientists.  Burnham laments this fact, claiming that science lost its battle with 
superstition because those who “fought against the forces of occultism and self-
interested authority,” referring to scientists, left the field of popularization (247). 
In any case, the orthodox, “learned” science of professionals grew 
increasingly distant from all other types of knowledge during the last half of the 
nineteenth century, including its sensationalistic doppelganger in the public 
sphere.  The division had fully crystallized by the start of the twentieth century.  
This schism in society motivated C.P. Snow to give his famous “Two Cultures” 
lecture in 1959, observing that a “gulf of mutual incomprehension…hostility and 
dislike, but most of all lack of understanding” had divided academic authority into 
two broad camps, “Literary intellectuals at one pole – at the other scientists” (4).  
This two-party model of academia is, by Snow’s own admission, overly 
simplistic, but for the most part it may be better to imagine these two cultures as 
science and everything else.  After all, implicit in Snow’s argument is the notion 
of a monolithic, detached science.  Snow argues that culture fails to appreciate 
science’s distinguished capacity essentially because it fails to understand science, 
and the inability of the lay citizen to recite the second law of thermodynamics is a 
particularly memorable example of this point (Snow 15).  In short, before the mid 
1800’s, science was seen as something people do, but only a hundred years later it 
had become a calling, and the word “scientists” came to denote what people are.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TRADITIONAL FOES OF MODERN SCIENCE 
Snow’s indictment of “literary intellectuals” touches on a recurring point 
of conflict in science’s history, a point of conflict that has increased in intensity 
with science’s increased distinctness.  During the Enlightenment era, there was 
already division among literary Romanticists regarding the value of science.  
Some, like Percy Shelley (who was also a fearless atheist), were openly inspired 
by science and its potential to carry society into a more progressive age.  Others, 
like William Blake, were considerably less impressed by scientific objectivity.  
Then, as now, literary critiques of science typically displayed anxiety about the 
potential dangers of a purely objective, naturalistic, dehumanized society (Burns 
171).  Still, one was more likely to find scientific notions blended into artistic 
texts, and vice versa, during the eighteenth century than in following years, no 
doubt due to the hazy boundaries of science during that time.  As the lines on the 
academic map became darker, science and literature began to distinguish 
themselves as incompatible ways of thinking.  By the latter nineteenth century the 
contrast was pronounced.  Perhaps no better example of this in the Victorian era 
exists than the now famous (and friendly) exchange between Thomas Huxley and 
Matthew Arnold, an exchange that largely anticipated and informed Snow’s later 
argument (Collini xv).      
 The modern form of the conflict between science and literature, or the 
humanities in general, is the perceived attack on science from what Paul Gross 
and Norman Levitt refer to as the “academic left,” a vague category of 
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postmodern humanists from various ideological camps (that include feminism, 
environmentalism, and multiculturalism) who display a uniform and 
unambiguously hostile tone in relation to science (2).  To be fair, Gross and Levitt 
do not question the validity of these theoretical schools per se, but rather their 
interrogation of scientific objectivity, to which the humanists tend to attach a 
notion of cultural constructivism that is wholly inappropriate in the eyes of 
orthodox science.  This criticism goes beyond simply questioning the political or 
cultural power structure inherent in the scientific institution, but in many cases is 
openly critical of the actual content of scientific knowledge.  Such censure, 
according to Gross and Levitt, “seem[s] often to escape mere inaccuracy and rush 
hell-for-leather toward unalloyed twaddle.  Such words may strike the reader as 
splenetic; but they seem to us justified in view of certain recent developments” 
(43). 
 An even more striking condemnation of postmodernism occurred in 1996 
when physicist Alan Sokal submitted an essay to the prestigious American 
cultural-studies journal Social Text, which was accepted and published, only 
afterwards revealing it to be a hoax.  The article, entitled “Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” is a 
parody of postmodernist attacks on the objective knowledge of science, is replete 
with quotations from such notable theorists as Derrida and Latour, and makes 
such bold claims as “physical ‘reality’, no less than social ‘reality’, is at bottom a 
social and linguistic construct” (Sokal 213).  The episode, according to Sokal and 
Bricmont, is indicative of the way in which postmodern theorists “exploit the 
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prestige of natural sciences in order to give their own discourse a veneer of rigor,” 
but without really understanding the rhetoric they employ (5).  Gross and Levitt 
similarly believe that the problem ultimately lies in the humanists’ encroachment 
into the scientific arena by condemning scientific principles they do not 
comprehend.  For example, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle has become a 
favorite metaphor among those seeking to undermine science’s authority, 
essentially claiming that “since physics has discovered the uncertainty principle, it 
can no longer provide reliable information about the physical world, has lost its 
claim to objectivity, and is now embedded in the unstable hermeneutics of 
subject-object relations” (Gross and Levitt 51).  Such a claim is in actuality a 
critical misreading of Heisenberg and demonstrates the connotative power of 
language.  Gross and Levitt regret that Heisenberg chose such an evocative term 
for his theory, musing that all this misrepresentation might have been avoided 
with a different name (51). 
 But what are these scientists really afraid of?  What threat does the 
“academic left” actually pose?  Gross and Levitt concede that in the short-term 
science will not be affected by the supposed rebellion of the humanities, but that 
as their mode of thinking about science becomes perpetuated among 
nonscientists, the public will learn to approach science in dangerously distorted 
ways (4).  Sokal and Bricmont make a similar observation, and hope that with 
increased education about what science “really” is, society could evolve into an 
“intellectual culture that would be rationalist but not dogmatic…open-minded but 
not frivolous, and politically progressive but not sectarian,” essentially the ideal 
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society of the Enlightenment (211).  These observations, along with the above 
concession about the power of language to shape perceptions about science, seem 
to contradict the overall message of these scientists.  Despite their impassioned 
defense of pure, unconstructed and empirical reality, they fear that the way people 
talk about, and ultimately think about, science will alter or even corrupt the 
discipline, something that may have already happened to the formerly “pure” 
sciences of anthropology or sociology (Gross and Levitt 256).  Furthermore, by 
situating the eternal and absolute truths they are defending against attacks from 
the “left,” the authors employ a rhetoric that places their argument squarely in the 
protean and unstable realm of political ideology.  Nowadays it seems at least as 
likely to find anti-science rhetoric emerging from the right.  In short, they argue 
that science is beyond cultural constructivism, while fearing that if too many 
people begin to think otherwise science will be fundamentally changed.   
 Without question many attacks on science from the humanities, or 
anywhere else, overstep the appropriate bounds.  Sokal and Bricmont rightly 
observe that science as a concept has several variations, from an intellectual 
endeavor to a distinct social group, and that criticisms of science often fail 
because they simply target the wrong aspect (202).  There is nothing wrong with a 
desire not to be misrepresented by nonscientists.  What does seem striking is the 
thinly veiled assurance among some in the scientific community that their 
methodology is the only type of valid epistemology, and how fiercely territorial 
they are of their knowledge.  Science’s defenders militate strictly against anyone 
venturing onto their playing field without the proper credentials, maintaining that 
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only they are qualified to comment on scientific matters.  The attacks from 
outside the discipline are supposedly motivated primarily by a desire to bring 
down a critical pillar of the military, industrial and political structures of society, 
along with a healthy dose of personal resentment; as Gross and Levitt claim, “the 
aroma of sour grapes is in the air” (26). 
 Despite the animosity of these scientists toward postmodernism, if they 
seek to portray science as the victim of attack from the dangerous and overly 
respected humanities, they will have a difficult time.  The annual budget for the 
National Science Foundation for the fiscal year of 2011 was $6.8 billion (Budget 
Request).  The annual budget for the National Endowment for the Humanities in 
2011 was $154.6 million (Appropriations Request 11).  Such an immense 
difference in funding strongly suggests that contemporary society assigns a 
hugely disproportionate level of importance to each field.  True, science may be a 
more costly endeavor, as research often requires expensive equipment and 
materials.  Still, if the amount of government investment in an academic field is 
any indication of importance, science clearly comes out ahead of the humanities.  
Money talks, and in the competition for support between science and the 
humanities, there really is no contest.       
Of course, an academic conflict between science and the humanities may 
appear to many as simply a battle waged across the university campus, with little 
significance to the greater population.  For the majority of society, the most 
visible and formidable opposition to science comes from its old traditional 
nemesis: religion.  No greater institution with which to situate science in culture 
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exists than religion.  The two great intellectual sovereigns have been battling in 
the rhetorical arena for centuries, and each has exerted an enormous influence on 
the other.  This conflict has produced libraries of investigation, reflection, and 
argument.  But as I already indicated, what science and religion share, namely a 
claim to describe reality, seems to be a more useful object of consideration.  
Religion has, of course, been around much longer and has been subject to the 
shifts of public discourse in a way that science is now.  Like science, the way we 
think about religion has a great deal to do with how we speak to each other about 
it.   
 Coleman states that science and theology were the only two “sovereigns” 
of the intellectual domain to exist in the modern age, being universally respected 
for the knowledge they possess, but that now there are none (4).  How did this 
come to be?  How did science manage to dethrone theology, and yet fail to 
occupy that throne itself?  In the opening left by religion’s overthrow, several 
missionaries of science have stepped up in an attempt to complete the revolution.  
Richard Dawkins is a very public example of just such a radical, antireligious 
ambassador of “pure science”.  To Dawkins’ view, the “overweening confidence 
with which the religious assert minute details for which they neither have, nor 
could have, any evidence” leaves theology wholly unqualified to comment upon 
matters relating to the physical universe, or anything for that matter (34).  He 
wonders why society gives such credence to the opinions of religious experts and 
not gardeners or chefs, who he views as having an equal claim on authority 
(Dawkins 56).  The notion that reality is an observable phenomenon and that 
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literal, verifiable accuracy is the most important object to aspire to reverberates 
throughout Dawkins’ argument.  This ideal attachment to pure, unbiased 
objectivity is often referred to as the “religion” of science.  Ultimately, believing 
in anything other than demonstrable and observable truth, in a very literal and 
tangible sense, hobbles society and can only lead to bigotry and oppression.  
Another well-known crusader for science puts it bluntly when he says that there 
exists a tendency to “suggest that science and religious belief are somehow related 
and should be treated as equals… The problem is, they are not” (Krauss). 
 Meanwhile, the argument from the religious side claims that theology 
provides a fully functional worldview, while science merely provides a view of 
the world.  Science’s materialistic and naturalistic philosophy is claimed to cause 
the erosion of fundamental values such as freedom and agency.  William Dembski 
concisely summarized this view when he said that “naturalism promises to free 
humanity from the weight of sin by dissolving the very concept of sin…Yes, we 
pollute the earth and decimate rainforests…but all of this is in accord with 
nature’s laws, not in violation of them” (qtd. in Thurs 174).  Interestingly, 
Dembski’s association of science with environmental destruction chooses to 
ignore the presence of environmental sciences like ecology.  Rather, he chooses to 
focus on the aspects of science that will best serve his argument.  Such maneuvers 
are common in this debate. 
 In this conflict there are also many who sit in the middle and try to 
reconcile these two modes of thought.  The easiest way to accomplish this is 
perhaps with a concept like Stephen Jay Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria” 
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(5).  According to this argument, science and religion are not really in conflict 
because they occupy two entirely different spheres.  Science answers the “how” 
questions of the universe, while religion deals with the “why”.  However, this 
simple explanation fails to satisfy many of the proponents of either side.  Dawkins 
asks, “Why shouldn’t we comment on God, as scientists?...a universe with a 
creative superintendent would be a very different kind of universe from one 
without.  Why is that not a scientific matter?” (55).  Coleman, on the other hand, 
writes, “Gould would have us believe that we can produce a pure science and a 
pure theology, each queen of her own domain…[he], however, is trying to 
recreate a world of clear and distinct ideas…science operates with a methodology 
that is consciously and unconsciously social and political” (172).  Furthermore, as 
with the position of science in the larger culture, the presence of intermediaries 
who try to bridge the gap between science and religion inevitably draw attention 
to that gap in the process.  This is a discussion that will not go away.   
Neither side seems to give much thought to the process of how the 
argument gets shaped by its consumers, or on the ambiguous nature of the 
vocabulary used.  Coleman notes that pitting science against “religion” is 
misleading because it implies a cohesive, single religious body, preferring the 
term “theology” instead (5).  Yet there is no mention that science is also a hugely 
discordant and fragmented body.  Furthermore, the rivalry is in reality less 
between science and religion than between two versions of science, often being 
fought between scientists.  Today, the most noticeable clash that is explicitly 
grounded in religion is in the debate over teaching the concept of “intelligent 
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design” in the classroom, a movement ostensibly started to provide more 
“objectivity” when teaching Darwinian evolution (Thurs 159).  This desire for 
objectivity is interesting; the proponents of science have traditionally been the 
ones to accuse religion of lacking objectivity.  Such a reversal of terms 
demonstrates the erratic nature of this “war” within the larger framework of 
American culture.   
The vast majority of Americans still claim belief in some form of deity, 
and Judeo-Christian ideology in particular is representative of mainstream cultural 
values.  With so much emphasis placed on religious tradition, one may expect that 
religious texts like the Bible would provide the most reliable source of wisdom on 
how to live.  Yet, as Dawkins observes, there are many rules put forth in the Bible 
that, were they to be enacted today, would be viewed with universal horror (269).  
The point is that people choose what to believe, freely selecting the ideas that 
make the most sense to them out of a vast collection of rhetorical tools.  Similarly, 
Dawkins notes the tendency of the religious to pounce upon any scientific 
discovery that they see as supporting their cause, while unequivocally shunning 
any that do not (59).  While he is certainly not wrong in these observations, 
Dawkins’ assertion that these tendencies display an inconsistency unique to 
religion is itself an example of seeing what one chooses to see.  He gives very 
little attention to the possibility that perhaps people believe what they believe 
simply because it helps them make sense of their own lives.  He only briefly 
mentions people who live a religious life because they “believe in belief” 
(Dawkins 14). 
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Science was able only to dethrone and not defeat religion in society 
because ultimately it could not provide a clearly superior worldview, even though 
it could provide an alternative one. Neither exerts total dominance as a rhetorical 
concept because both are constantly being reshaped and manipulated by the way 
they are consumed by the public, which utilizes the mantle of science and religion 
to direct its own complex and often conflicting social or political agendas.  The 
transcendent, spiritual authority once held by religion has been shattered, unable 
to withstand the scrutiny of scientific inquiry, which reduced much of the former 
sovereign into a collection of anecdotal platitudes.  Famed mythologist Joseph 
Campbell noted this, eloquently summing up religion’s deprived status, saying, 
“When a civilization begins to reinterpret its mythology in this way, the life goes 
out of it, temples become museums, and the link between the two perspectives is 
dissolved.  Such a blight has certainly descended on the Bible and on a great part 
of the Christian cult” (249).  Science, meanwhile, has been steadily prevented 
from saturating society by the unyielding opposition of religious fundamentalism.   
Whether in conflict with postmodern theory or religious dogma, science’s 
contention with other realms of thought is typically over the authority to make 
pronouncements concerning the real world.  Despite the claim that scientific truth 
exists wholly “out there,” independent of human thought or influence, science is 
ultimately just one of many ways to see the world around us.  The tendency to see 
science as a collection of ahistorical, packets of pure truth we call “facts” 
obscures this, but despite appearances to the contrary, scientists are people.  Like 
all people, they attempt to construct a cohesive ideology that explains why things 
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are the way they are.  Literary theorist Slavoj Žižek asserts that “ideology is…a 
fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our ‘reality’ itself: an ‘illusion’ 
which structures our effective, real social relations” (45).  In other words, our 
ideology shapes our reality, not the other way around.  Additionally, like all 
people scientists are limited to explaining that reality through the use of symbols.  
It may also be beneficial here to think of the “real” in a somewhat Lacanian sense: 
something that resists symbolization, that is eternally out of reach and yet always 
present.  Without a doubt there really is a universe out there that exists 
independent of human thought.  But the second we try to grasp it, to symbolize it 
by coining a new word or building a molecular diagram, we have altered it to fit a 
constructed ideology. Whether one tries to symbolize the “real” with 
mathematical equations, with God, or any other concept appears to make little 
difference in the end.   Science is restricted to the same imperfect symbols that 
limit everything else. 
But that does not stop many physicists from seeking a universal “theory of 
everything.”  With such a theory in place “[s]cience would no longer be an 
empirical matter, but a branch of deductive logic, with the laws of nature 
acquiring the status of mathematical theorems, and the properties of the world 
deducible by the application of reason alone” (Davies 165).  Such an idea is 
certainly appealing, but reduces all of reality to a code that must be cracked, 
something to which we much align ourselves.  Additionally, its pursuit is unlikely 
to garner much interest from the public, who can do no more than cheer from the 
sidelines.  Many people in the world already have a functional “theory of 
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everything,” namely religion.  Religion may very well be a primitive belief 
system and responsible for many unsavory elements of culture, yet “primitive 
beliefs are functional, they maintain themselves and are hard to displace” 
(Burnham 11).  When it comes to the “big questions” of life, religion provides 
answers that science does not, and to most people any answer is better than none.  
Quite simply, it may not be perfect, but it gets the job done.  Religion also has the 
added advantage of allowing its adherents to be participants as well.  As Cooter 
and Pumfrey write, “Although religion, like science, could be a tool of social 
control, unlike science it was open to popular movements which made appeals to 
the legitimacy of popular experience” (254).  True, theologians and clergymen 
exercise a degree of authority, but their presence does not prevent lay citizens 
from getting involved in the religious experience, or actively choosing another 
one that better suits their needs.  Even people who shun organized religion can 
still be “religious.”  Like early notions of science, religion is still something 
people do.    
 Science, the humanities, and religion have been crippled by each other and 
corrupted by the public.  Now their rivalry is locked in a never-ending stalemate, 
endlessly debating about how we should choose to define something.  While 
under attack on two fronts, the scientific community has become so engrossed in 
its crusade for cultural dominance that it seems to have overlooked the possibility 
that the public, for which it supposedly contends, may simply not want an 
intellectual sovereign anymore. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PUBLIC'S REINTERPRETATION OF SCIENCE 
The purpose of this brief account of the history of science popularization, 
and the rhetorical battle between science and its most common contemporary 
foes, is to demonstrate the power held by the public sphere in determining the 
shape and scope of the scientific institution.  Though scientists like Sokal and 
Dawkins insist that science exists apart from the public, and do their utmost to 
fend off any intruders who seek to question this, the truth is that science is a 
human institution and subject to the vacillations of human cultural conditions.  
The concept of “pure,” untouchable scientific truth is surely valid, but whether or 
not such pure science can be perfectly realized by, or integrated into, society is a 
more problematic question.  Therefore, “science” is also a word thrown into the 
unstable sea of public interpretation, where it can function on a number of levels 
and be defined in a number of ways.  Science in the Enlightenment was very 
different than in the Victorian era.  Science today is unlike anything that came 
before, and not simply because scientific knowledge has become more intricate.  
Though religion and the “academic left” may appear threatening to science, in a 
strictly rhetorical war they ultimately pose little threat, and can at best impede its 
progress.  The real danger to the institution, as Burnham makes clear, is the 
potential of being rendered impotent by a public that surrenders a strictly rational 
worldview, that is, “functional” superstition (11).  “Superstition,” used in this 
sense, refers not only to nonscientific supernatural or religious beliefs, but also to 
the way popular opinion overpowers science’s authoritative voice.  
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The ways science is popularized have profound implications for how it 
develops.  Yet considering the critical importance of science to society over the 
past several centuries, remarkably little scholarly attention has been given to the 
way science interacts with, and is in turn altered by, the public through the 
process of popularization.  In a 1994 review of what work on science 
popularization had been done, Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey wrote:  
Still shrouded in obscurity are the effects of even the most obvious 
mechanisms for the transmission of scientific knowledge and 
culture: the popular press, radio and television, to say nothing of 
science texts, museums, school curricula, and the overtly 
propagandist productions of the science lobby itself…our 
ignorance of both the low drama and the high art of science’s 
diffusion and modes of popular production and reproduction is 
staggering. (237) 
Without a clear understanding of how science is shaped by the public sphere, the 
diffusionist model became a common way to comprehend the transmission of 
scientific knowledge.  This model suggests that as the scientific community 
acquires knowledge, that knowledge flows “downstream” to the public, where it 
is inevitably misunderstood or “watered down” for consumption by a public that 
lacks a rigorous scientific training.  Cooter and Pumfrey (and myself) take issue 
with this model, however, saying, “Diffusion may be seen as passive ‘trickle-
down’ or as osmotic, though in either case popularization is not being construed 
as dynamic…Preferable to the watery analogy…might be those of grafting, 
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appropriating, and transformation” (249).  The diffusionist model presumes that 
popular science lags behind the scientific establishment, and passively collects the 
information that flows out of that fountain of knowledge.  The consideration that 
scientific knowledge could be “recoded” with different significance does not fit in 
this model.  “Successfully popularized natural knowledge may take on very 
different meanings within popular culture from those intended by its 
popularizers…In short, ‘popular science’ may diverge from ‘learned science’ not 
because the latter is poorly understood, but because it is developed by its 
recipients for different purposes” (Cooter and Pumfrey 249).  Thus, an awareness 
of the networks of communication within society is critical to any attempt to 
discuss popularization.  “Since ‘popularizations’ are communicative processes, 
their histories must attend to the history of communicative production, and hence 
to such discontinuities as those between print, electrical and electronic culture” 
(Cooter and Pumfrey 239).  In other words, the media shapes the public’s 
conceptions of what science is, or is not. 
The passing of the torch from scientists to the media as the primary 
missionaries of science is a particularly sore spot for Burnham.  During this trend 
of popularization, which he claims begins in earnest during the nineteenth 
century, those who used science for their own vain ambitions gradually replaced 
the well-informed advocates of pure science.  Burnham succinctly lays out this 
pattern of popularization as follows: 
1) Diffusion – when science did not need condensation, 
simplification, and translation; 
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2) Popularization – when men of science tried to share their vision 
of the religion of science; 
3) Dilution – when popularization passed into the hands of 
educators, who represented science only at second hand, and, 
simultaneously, journalists; 
4) Trivialization – when popular science consisted of impotent 
snippets of news, the product of authority figures. (226) 
The terms he uses to define each step may cause some confusion, but the process 
seems clear enough.  The final step is of particular interest as it involves the most 
significant method that the public uses to alter scientific knowledge.  During this 
phase of trivialization, “science in the realm of popularizers changed from a 
coherent view of nature, including humans, into choppy, unconnected ‘facts’” 
(Burnham 5).  This development is critical to Burnham’s argument, as it is in this 
decontextualizing of scientific principles that science and superstition become 
indistinguishable.  Science essentially becomes a modern form of magic when it 
develops into an assortment of independent bits of information that more closely 
resemble incantations than products of intense investigation.  In their significant 
work, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar note that facts are notoriously difficult to contextualize because, “a 
fact only becomes such when it loses all temporal qualifications and becomes 
incorporated into a large body of knowledge drawn upon by others…it has, by 
definition, lost all historical reference” (106).  The establishment of a fact as an 
irrefutable and isolated source of knowledge serves to increase the distance 
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between science and the public, who for the most part do not bother asking where 
the fact came from.  Whereas early versions of science derived authority from 
their accessibility, the modern form achieves it through separation.  Whether one 
sees this reduction of science into sound bites as the passive result of the 
diffusionist model, or as an active process of reshaping science, it successfully 
dismembered any cohesive scientific worldview the public may have had, and 
served to further alienate the formal scientific establishment from public 
discourse.  Science still retained its voice of indisputable expertise, but now it did 
so beyond the scope of the average citizen.   
Yet the public did not completely lose interest in science.  Instead, it 
simply refashioned scientific discourse into the channels of popular culture, and 
without open access to the official scientific establishment, much of that pop 
culture took as its starting point that very distance between itself and science.  The 
“mad scientist” motif so familiar to pop culture is an excellent example as it relies 
on the notion of the scientist being out of touch with normal life, often with 
dangerous or misguided ambitions.  True, as an image the “mad scientist” has 
existed since at least the early nineteenth century, but its survival and proliferation 
in the modern day witness to the lasting appeal of this notion.  Even 
representations of non-“mad” scientists portray them as being a breed apart.  The 
image of scientists found commonly in film or other media usually consists of 
bespectacled men (representations of women scientists are a fairly recent 
phenomenon) in white lab coats, surrounded by impressive and expensive looking 
machinery, bubbling test tubes of colorful chemicals, and chalkboards filled with 
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incomprehensible mathematical notation (Frayling 222).  Such exaggerated 
characteristics tend to make these scientists look less like men and women and 
more like modern wizards, busily unraveling the mysteries of the universe and 
other secrets far beyond the mind of the common man.  As Christopher Frayling 
writes, “The gap between specialized knowledge and public understanding lies at 
the root of most fictional cinematic representations of the scientist…The gap has 
usually been filled by stereotypical representations of one kind or another” (11).   
 Of course, the forms of science created by popular culture were not 
limited to the entertainment or advertising arenas.  The public’s simultaneous 
fascination with and separation from science allowed for the formation of entirely 
new entities, such as what is now known as “pseudoscience.”  Though the term 
first began to circulate during the evolution debates of the late 1800’s, it’s usage 
was inconsistent, often being used by critics of evolution to devalue what was 
seen as an overly materialistic view of nature (Thurs 66).  But by the mid 1900’s, 
the definition of “pseudoscience” was much more specific, even if its boundaries 
were not.  Everything from the search for Bigfoot, to astral projection, to 
extraterrestrial abductions, to the investigation of haunted houses fell under 
pseudoscience’s jurisdiction.  Such strange topics seemingly have very little in 
common, except for their position in relation to orthodox science, which views 
them as anathema.  This enmity, however, fails to pose much of a hindrance to the 
practitioners of pseudoscientific inquiry, many of whom possess a “cheerful 
acceptance of a position outside of science, even [among] those intent on making 
serious statements about the material world” (Thurs 156).  Ultimately, 
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pseudoscience represents a reaction in opposition to what was seen as constrictive 
and impersonal monopolies on the realm of belief, be they scientific or religious.  
Being, according to Burnham, “contemptuous equally of science and religion” 
pseudoscience can “freely kid around with either or both” borrowing scientific or 
theological terminology in order to validate their claims (10).  Public interest in 
the bizarre certainly is not new.  But the tendency of these strange offshoots to 
take on the appearance of legitimate (which is to say “official”) science is a 
uniquely modern development.         
 Whatever the form, be it as entertainment or “weird science”, the 
intentionally unorthodox science of popular culture usually seeks to impart a 
sense of importance or purpose into a science that has lost all relevance to normal 
life.  As the public view of science became increasingly disconnected and fact-
based, successful popularizers often became “storytellers who devised compelling 
narratives that allowed them to expound on the larger philosophical questions 
embedded within scientific discoveries” (Pandora and Rader 357).  Not unlike the 
philosophers before the industrial revolution, modern popular science seeks to 
establish an overarching context wherein common citizens can make sense of 
science within their own lives, and avoids the use of specialized vernacular that 
would render it unapproachable.  It also provides an outlet for various desires or 
anxieties unfulfilled by official science.  Carl Sagan put forth the notion once that 
pseudoscience exists because of an unfulfilled religious need, and yet to that I 
would add an unfulfilled scientific one (Thurs 154).  The search for the Loch Ness 
Monster could be appealing to a person who is concerned with a totally 
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materialistic and overly rational view of the world, and that person is likely 
comforted by an understanding (perhaps repressed) that the search will never end.  
Stories of people getting abducted and experimented upon by aliens might 
resonate with those who are struggling to make sense of ethical concerns and 
debates over how science should treat the natural world.  Rather than dismissing 
pseudoscience as childish or, worse, dangerous, we should be asking why it 
appeals to the public and how that reflects on the position of official science. 
Meanwhile, the diversification of new narrative genres like science fiction 
demonstrates the public’s ability to use science as a backdrop against which to 
explore personal or societal issues.  Science fiction, after all, is almost never about 
science.  Instead, it creates a fantastical environment while disavowing the 
impossibility of that setting by its appeal to science and technology; it allows 
fantasy-like situations to exist in the “real” world.  “People want to believe such 
fictions,” writes Thomas Disch, “Hence, the authenticating ‘science’ in the 
compound ‘science fiction,’ with its implicit guarantee that this dream might 
come true, as against the surreal or supernatural events of fantasy or fable” (3).  
Essentially, the rockets and ray guns of science fiction become a believable 
replacement for the magic and mysticism of the fantasy genre, even if the science 
is given just as little explanation.  This is hardly remarkable to a public that is 
inundated with the products of scientific production, yet with virtually no 
understanding of where they come from.  Those products may appear miraculous 
to society, and indeed the phrase “miracles of modern science” is frequently used.  
Therefore, faster-than-light space travel, transporter beams and cybernetic humans 
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appear with very little comment in science fiction stories; to the lay reader those 
items are no less inexplicable than cell phones, GPS navigation, or Tylenol.  
Science already appears to have magically provided society with the wonders of 
technology; why not assume such progress will continue, all the way to the warp 
drive?  
When compared to such captivating and unusual creations, orthodox 
science may seem awfully dull.  Luckily, for those whom it bores, its aloofness 
allows it to be easily ignored.  Accordingly, discussions of complex theoretical 
issues rarely emerge in public discourse anymore, usually appearing only as 
minor blurbs well away from front-page news.  Consumer-driven demand for new 
products of science pushes the emphasis consistently away from theoretical 
science and toward its applied version.  Technology and medicine in particular 
have become the major enterprise of science today, so much so in fact that they 
seem to have been rhetorically severed from the larger body of science.  Terms 
such as “science and technology” or “science and health” permeate the media and 
imply the notion that technology and health are distinct from the irrelevance of 
science, as if applied science and pure science are totally unrelated.  Thurs 
observes that the “rush to emphasize [science’s] application easily led to a sense 
that there was no such thing as pure science, at least none worth talking about” 
(121).   
This situation is deplorable to Burnham, who declares (in his book’s 
closing paragraph) that the popular insistence on utility produced “’scientists’ 
[that] were in fact narrow technicians who did a job without a calling…[who] did 
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not struggle with other population elements for possession of the public mantle of 
science…[and who] did not even know what civilization was, or perhaps science 
as such” (262).  Interestingly, the media largely seems to share Burnham’s 
opinion.  Frayling points out that among cinematic representations of scientists 
the trait that virtually all “bad” scientists have in common is an affiliation with 
large corporate or government organizations (215).  He writes, “Mainstream 
science has become thoroughly institutionalized…and the new scientific heroes 
are seen as heroes because only they have the special insight to prevent these 
institutions from distorting science” (Frayling 215).  The idea of a scientist who 
selflessly promotes pure science without regard to political or monetary gain 
hearkens back to the Enlightenment’s ideal natural philosopher, and seems to 
indicate distaste for the “big business” perception of science among the public 
sphere.  Science itself is not necessarily seen as a bad thing; science with 
unchecked power and immunity from public accountability is. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SCIENCE AND THE NEW MEDIA 
No matter how we choose to talk about science today, we will be unable to 
escape the influence of the modern media.  Whether on television, in print, online, 
or in pop culture, all discussion is framed within the body of the communication 
network that encircles the globe.  The way the media packages information has 
profound implications on how we see science.  In a way, we might even say that 
we have been conditioned by our connection to the media to think in certain ways 
about science.  How do media icons such as the “mad scientist” or the chart of 
human evolution affect our beliefs?  How do dramatizations like Inherit the Wind 
or Jurassic Park influence what the public thinks of science’s role in life?  How 
do documentaries like An Inconvenient Truth or Food, Inc. direct social pressure?  
And these are all examples of the “old” linear media, the media controlled by a 
relatively small segment of society in which information flows unidirectionally to 
a generally voiceless audience.  In recent years a blossoming of digital technology 
has created a “new media,” one marked by audience participation and 
convergence.  If it ever was safe to assume that the public was a captive audience 
and would be the spoils of war to whoever won the battle of science and religion 
(marketed by the media with the same giddy anticipation of a pay-per-view fight), 
that time has certainly passed now. 
Critical to Burnham’s definition of superstition is the concept of the 
authority figure.  “In any culture,” he writes, “superstition involves the idea that 
some assertion has validity…by the mid-twentieth century, however, the 
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authorities for such superstitious belief as there was overwhelmingly consisted of 
television and peers” (Burnham 18).  Recall that this was in 1987, and the shape 
of media is vastly different now.  Still, “television and peers” is an interesting 
coupling; Burnham seems to have possessed a bit of clairvoyance.   
The power of the mainstream media to alter content is no new idea, though 
it often goes unnoticed.  Burnham forcibly points this out: “One of the myths of 
the twentieth-century was that the media controllers were passive vessels through 
which science popularization passed and that any distortions were mere 
institutional by-products or even accidents.  The truth was otherwise” (240).  
Once journalists (a catch-all term for any media authority) got their hands on 
scientific popularization, so the tale goes, they “militated actively against the 
religion of science, even though the ‘facts’ of science and health may have been 
acceptable or useful to the journalists” (Burnham 241).  For whatever reason, 
media pundits channeled scientific news in such a way that “the focus of science 
popularization should be science policy – which lay, of course, in the media 
world, where scientific findings could be ‘controversial’” (Burnham 241).  
Burnham’s dissatisfaction with the media seems to be in the tendency to drag the 
noble “religion of science” down to the social or political level.  On one hand, he 
is right.  The news media certainly gives disproportionate airtime to scientific 
stories thought to cause a stir, particularly if it can give them snazzy monikers like 
“Climategate” to encourage a maximum amount of water-cooler discussion.  But 
Burnham’s insistence that mainstream media is out to get science fails to 
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acknowledge that the ways science gets disseminated in the media could be 
necessary or even helpful.   
One of the byproducts of science’s relegation to the outskirts of culture 
was that science lost a human face in public discourse.  That Einstein is still the 
archetypal scientist in popular culture is an indication of just how out of touch 
science has been for the last sixty or so years, and interestingly, even Einstein’s 
rise to fame may be linked to a media campaign (Thurs 98).  To remedy this, 
science needs patrons.  “Patrons, who have to be actively enrolled by the learned 
scientific community no less than publics, do not merely fund science, but 
significantly determine its nature and purpose” (Cooter and Pumfrey 251).  The 
hyper-professionalization of science, and the world in general, in this day makes it 
difficult to gain much attention as someone who can speak for science without 
some sort of credentials.  Certainly those scientists like Hawking, Gould, or 
Dawkins meet this requirement.  Yet one need not be a scientist per se to direct 
science.  Consider the influence the politician Al Gore exerted on the issue of 
climate change.  The concept of “global warming” had been a relatively 
ambiguous topic discussed mainly in non-mainstream media for years, but after 
Gore “popularized” it American culture raced into a “green” revolution.  It had 
become a topic of conversation, and whether they hated him or applauded him, Al 
Gore had become the unlikely face of environmentalism to most Americans.  
Burnham possibly would see all this political controversy as detrimental to the 
impersonal “religion of science,” but if nothing else it shows how to at least make 
the public aware of science in the first place. 
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The other issue Burnham has with the media is with its usurpation of 
authority from scientists.  He is upset that the public believes journalists without 
question, while implying that they should be doing that with scientists instead.  
Anthropologist Jonathan Marks points out the irony that Latour was criticized for 
his exposition on the construction of scientific facts and his failure to distinguish 
between fact and mere assertion of fact.  Marks asks, “How do we tell them 
apart?  How can we distinguish between what’s “really” there and what the 
experts tell us is there – whether it’s the number of chromosomes in the human 
cell, the motion of the solar system, or the nature of subatomic particles?” (Marks 
268).  What about the mistaken old theories of science?  They were once 
presented as “facts,” how can the public tell the “real” from the “assertion of 
real”?  The answer, of course, is that it only can be told what is a fact, and that is 
all.  Pluto was a planet “in fact,” until we were told that it was not.  Nothing 
changed with Pluto, just our definition.  
The scientific community could potentially gain valuable insight from the 
savvy approach of the mainstream media to this new media.  Noting the difficulty 
in creating programming to satisfy the newly fragmented public, mainstream 
media instead chose to invest its resources into niche-marketing strategies that 
appeal more strongly to specific communities, a strategy that has paid off 
handsomely (Levin 257).  Science could make use of this same concept by 
focusing its attention on specific groups that will be most receptive to it, a 
practice which could pay off monetarily (which scientists could always use) as 
well as creatively.  The shift in the media is apparent in a number of cable 
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networks ostensibly devoted to scientific education, like the Discovery Channel or 
the Science Channel, which in recent years have altered their programming to 
accommodate one very unique form of television that has risen from the new 
media: so-called “reality” TV.  Though the actual science content may vary in 
these programs, a noticeable shift away from more “hard” science programming is 
apparent to anyone who has tuned in over the past few years.  Additionally, a 
large portion of the primetime lineup on these educational channels often contains 
recurring programing addressing pseudoscientific topics such as cryptozoology or 
UFOs.  While this is surely distressing to orthodox scientists, this shift in 
programming simply demonstrates that the network is paying attention to the 
demands of popular culture.  Science needs to learn how to utilize the mainstream 
media in more productive ways.  After all, the motivation of that media is no 
mystery: profit.  Science needs to sell itself.  That statement would surely disgust 
scientific purists who believe science to be above such petty pursuits.  But 
popularizers have been “selling” science for years now, and have even discovered 
the tricks to making it work.  Rather than object that the public does not care 
about science, scientists should be more willing to meet the public half way. 
The issue of authority has become infinitely more complicated with the 
rise of “participatory culture” over the last few years.  The advent of “Web 2.0” in 
about 2002 marks a watershed moment, a revolution every bit as significant as 
anything the nineteenth century experienced.  And like in that previous 
communication revolution, the very concept of science stands to be radically 
changed.  This new media operates with a strong emphasis on collaboration, 
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collective intelligence, information sharing, and user-production.  The 
entertainment, commercial and industrial worlds have already been rocked by this 
media paradigm shift, and now we are starting to see its effects in politics, and 
scholarship.  At the heart of this shift is the transformation of the average citizen 
from audience-subject, to user-subject.  Henry Jenkins addresses this: 
Convergence does not occur through media appliances, however 
sophisticated they may become.  Convergence occurs within the 
brains of individual consumers and through their social interactions 
with others.  Each of us constructs our own personal mythology 
from bits and fragments extracted from the media flow and 
transformed into resources through which we make sense of our 
everyday lives.  Because there is more information on any given 
topic than anyone can store in their head, there is an added 
incentive for us to talk among ourselves about the media we 
consume…Consumption has become a collective process, that’s 
what this book means by collective intelligence. (3-4) 
The appearance of blogs, social networks, video sharing, cell phone uploading, 
and other phenomena across various platforms have given a voice to the once 
silent consumer, and given him or her an avenue to bypass the traditional sources 
of authority.  Rather than finding themselves as the passive receivers at the end of 
a unidirectional cascade of information, people now can become isolated and yet 
integrated actors in a free flowing network of ideas and knowledge.  This ability 
to become active agents in the processing and distribution of information has led 
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some cultural theorists to start using the term “prosumer” to describe the modern 
consumer of data.  A “prosumer” is a simultaneous producer and consumer, 
someone who watches “Big Brother” as much as “Big Brother” watches him.   
 Paradoxically, popular culture has at once been fragmented and unified by 
this new media.  Bohman, returning to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, 
observes that while early analyses of the web predicted a unified, democratized 
society, we have seen in actuality a  “public of publics rather than a unified public 
sphere based in a common culture or identity” (152).  By increasing individual 
participation, encouraging migration across media borders, and enabling the 
formation of specialized groups, it has partitioned society into distinct niches, 
groups of individuals with similar views and objectives, who develop a sense of 
collective identity.  At the same time, inter-user collaboration and information 
sharing has created a public that can instantly distribute information across the 
globe.  “Prosumers” create vast networks of peers with which to collaborate and 
share their viewpoints.  With this new ability to communicate directly with one 
another and circumvent the traditional channels of discourse, “prosumer” culture 
has created and destroyed corporations, celebrities, cultural icons, and in recent 
years we have even seen it alter political elections, foreign policy and literally 
overthrow dictatorships. 
This same dangerous potential hangs over orthodox science, threatening to 
expose any potentially embarrassing secrets it may have.  The polemic of 
“Climategate” rocketed through the media in the winter of 2009, sparked by 
hacked email accounts of climate researchers that indicated a degree of 
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manipulation of data.  The scientists were ultimately cleared of wrongdoing; 
accentuating certain data points in order to emphasize a single point is a common 
occurrence in the research field.  The controversy came from the supposed lack of 
“transparency” in the research, something that scientists likely have never needed 
to worry about much until now.  An editorial in Nature Geoscience magazine 
responded to the crisis by advising, “Along with greater openness, a much more 
nuanced and multifaceted discussion of the physical aspects of climate change 
needs to be presented to the public to avoid future accusations of cliquiness and 
gatekeeping” (509).   
Of course, the forming convergent culture also holds remarkable potential 
for scientific advancement.  In the last decade, a phenomenon known as 
“distributed computing” has become popular, through which individuals can 
“lend” a portion of their computer’s processing power while the system is idle to 
various research institutions across the globe.  This allows projects, with goals as 
diverse as cancer research to the mapping of pulsars, access to supercomputer-
level data processing at a fraction of the price, while allowing interested 
nonscientists to become helpful, if uninvolved, participants (Bohannon 811).  An 
even more powerful example of the creative potential that the new media may 
hold occurred in September of 2011.  For 15 years, AIDS researchers have been 
unable to develop a model of a retroviral protease found in the Mason-Pfizer 
monkey virus, a virus related to HIV that causes AIDS in monkeys, which 
matched the crystalline configurations observed in the lab.  So, in something of a 
social experiment, the question was given to the public in an online game called 
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“Fold.it,” a puzzle-based game that encourages collaboration and competition 
amongst its more than 236,000 members as they construct digital models of 
proteins.  The scientists gave the problem a three-week time limit online, but 
amazingly it was solved in just 10 days (Praetorius).  The story was received with 
some interest in the media, one article opening with the line: “You no longer need 
a Ph.D. to make an incredible scientific breakthrough,” but the implications of 
such an event seemed to go largely unsaid (Praetorius). 
 The “Fold.it” incident is an excellent demonstration of the power of 
collective intelligence, “a system built on community logics of re-use and 
permission rather than commercial logics of ownership and restriction.  [It] relies 
on the belief that with enough size and diversity, the community can achieve 
‘more than a closed team of professionals’” (Green and Jenkins 216).  Of course, 
this brings up a range of logistical questions, such as how will the notions of 
authorship, plagiarism, or peer review be affected?  Perhaps an appropriate 
question to ask is, “What will happen to science in the age of Wikipedia?”  
Though it may be the curse of every high school science teacher’s attempts to get 
students to cite “valid” sources, the discomfort with sites like Wikipedia on the 
part of official academic institutions originates less in the site’s content and more 
from its lack of institutional control.  It demonstrates the difficulty “learned 
science” is having with accepting that its authority to make intellectual 
pronouncements is not absolute.  Whatever one thinks of Wikipedia, in terms of 
sheer volume of information it easily surpasses any other single source.  An 
interesting trait of collective intelligence is that despite being comprised of 
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thousands or even millions of individuals with often-contradictory goals, the 
community as a whole often demonstrates an almost organic adaptability and 
singular consciousness. 
 The ways in which the new media landscape can and will affect how 
people relate to science are numerous and impossible to predict.  Instances such as 
the “Fold.it” game may provide clues to where things are heading, but as to 
specifically how science should approach this change is still unclear.  What is 
clear is that things have changed, and that the traditional, diffusionist model of 
science, with its emphasis on separation, control, and localized authority will 
surely not appeal to a public obsessed with connectivity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 For too long, science has worked to set itself up as being something apart 
from the life of the ordinary citizen.  With its self-congratulatory air of authority, 
science has assumed that the public has drifted away because of the ignorance, 
machinations, and corruption of popular culture, a juvenile repository of 
“paedomorphic” fantasies designed to make us feel better (Dawkins 350).  What 
too often go unquestioned are the relative nature of reality and the process of 
“knowledge-making” in cultural discourse.  Science does not have a monopoly on 
how to make sense of the world, on what “facts” mean, or how knowledge will be 
used.  “The great paradox of modern science,” writes Marks, “is that scientists are 
not trained to think about science; they are trained to do it, to carry it out…to 
collect data – but not to think about where knowledge comes from, or the 
relationship between science and technology” (266).  Science can produce 
technology, but cannot predict how people will use it or how it will shape culture.  
Science’s own risk of being marginalized by a technologic culture it helped create 
is evidence of that.     
 To be sure, science as an institution will never go away.  Technology will 
continue to progress; medicine will continue to advance.  But if scientists ever 
wish to be more than the “mere technicians” they are now, driven by 
commercialism and politics, they must learn to better integrate themselves into the 
larger public discourse of popular culture, “where something much more like 
multisided conversations about scientific topics take place, even if they do not 
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proceed in the orderly, organized fashion of the specialized norms of professional 
discourse” (Pandora and Rader 360).  This new “intellectual commons,” which is 
marked by “heterogeneity, dispersion, and contradictions,” is a place where the 
various voices and concerns of the public can be addressed, and science can 
become something relatable once again (Pandora and Rader 360).   
The way that popular culture has marginalized and reshaped science over 
the years, whether in entertainment, the formation of pseudo sciences, or the 
comparison with religion, have shown us all that no one definition of science is 
adequate.  Science is whatever we believe it to be. 
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